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Roland Barthes Dialect ician? 









n a footnote to his 1960 essay in Arguments, ‘Authors and Writers’ – 
marginalised in his work, as with all of Roland Barthes’s good ideas – 
we find this suggestion on the non-dialectical nature of language: 
 
Structure of reality and structure of language: no better 
indication of the difficulty of a coincidence between the 
two than the constant failure of the dialectic, once it 
becomes discourse: for language is not dialectic, it can only 
say: ‘we must be dialectical [il faut être dialectique]’, but it 
cannot be so itself: language is a representation without 
perspective, except precisely for the author’s; but the author 
dialecticizes himself, he does not dialecticize the world.1 
 
Not only a gentle allusion to the famous exhortation by Arthur 
Rimbaud, ‘Il faut être absolument moderne’, the injunction ‘Il faut être 
dialectique [we must be dialectical]’ – with the ‘we must’ written in 
italics in the original French – suggests that it is the position, the 
positioning, of the person analysing the outside world that counts for 
more than the objective nature of that outside world.2 In so doing, 
Barthes was gesturing towards the ‘parametrism’ that he would go on to 
praise in 1965 in his newspaper appreciation of Edgar Morin’s 
‘dialectical writing’ and which we will consider in a moment. The 
strength of this idea about language furthermore is shown by its 
repetition across Barthes’s œuvre. In his 1971 piece ‘Writers, 
Intellectuals, Teachers’, for example, Barthes underlined once more how 
language is not dialectical: ‘language […] allows only a movement in two 
stages […] (does not allow the third term other than as pure oratorical 
flourish, rhetorical assertion, pious hope)’.3 
     Indeed, in his final essay in 1980, Camera Lucida, we find a 
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Barthes’s own death suddenly appears to him ‘undialectical’; for, since he 
has no offspring, and in line with the Hegelian dialectic, his own death 
to come will produce nothing.4 Except that Barthes reverses chronology 
in the light of this non-dialectical (or anti-dialectical) situation, by 
considering his recently deceased mother as his daughter, as a product of 
his own life, and then proceeding to immortalise her by inscribing her 
into his essay on photography. As an attempt, which is finally in vain, by 
Barthes to turn things around, to reverse Time, and thereby overcoming 
death, the idea of a life that is undialectical is indebted also to Edgar 
Morin and to his thesis on the history of death, first published just as 
they first met in 1951 and the same year as an important article by 
Barthes, ‘Michelet, l’Histoire et la Mort’.5 It is as if the idea of an 
undialectical being applied to himself in 1980 meant that – borrowing 
and lightly modifying the formulation above – they had in fact 
‘undialecticised’ themselves! 
    In this article nevertheless, we will see that Barthes can still be 
considered a dialectical thinker and writer, if not an analyst of the 
dialectic, writing on and with the dialectic. So how do we get at this 
dialectic in operation in his work? This is a major difficulty with 
Barthes’s writing, with the following three options all to be avoided (at 
least in relation to Barthes). Firstly, despite Eric Marty’s recent 
affirmation of a ‘philosophical’ Barthes, we must resist a simple 
discussion of the dialectic in philosophical terms, as this would ignore 
the ‘suppleness’ of the Barthesian dialectic.6 Secondly, and in contrast, 
any analysis of the dialectic that privileged the play(fulness) of writing 
would no doubt overlook the ‘responsibility’, political or intellectual, 
that guided Barthes; for, even in those writings not published in his 
lifetime such as his notebooks from his 1974 visit to China, Barthes feels 
the urgent need to write in a dialectical – rather than what Simon Leys 
calls an ‘abyssal’ – manner.7 Finally, though it might be tempting to 
consider the Barthesian dialectic as a dialectical unity of these first two 
options – indeed, we will be analysing the ‘responsible’ nature of the 
‘play’ of language – it may well be too tidy a way to intertwine (our) 
analysis and (Barthes’s) writing. 
     The non-systematic, even down-right contradictory, way in 
which Barthes deploys the dialectic notwithstanding, we can affirm that, 
as a philosophical category and method of analysis, the dialectic in his 
work is both classical and modern, as devised by Hegel and then Marx, 
but reinvented in the structuralist and poststructuralist age.8 According 
to Louis-Jean Calvet’s biography, the young Barthes is inspired in 1932 
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by the dialectic used by the socialist and pacifist Jean Jaurès; but it is the 
‘suppleness’ of the Marxist dialectic, from 1945 onwards – as explained 
to Barthes by his friend Trotskyist friend and fellow tuberculosis-sufferer 
Georges Fournié during discussions in the sanatorium in Leysin at the 
end of the War – that will influence his work during the 1950s.9 The 
ambiguity in his attitude towards the dialectic, at the same time, is 
contained in the ‘amputated’ dialectic, itself considered  by Barthes in 
dialectical fashion, and this will become, in the 1970s, a fascination for 
the figure of the ‘spiral’. The spiral – ‘[t]hat dimension [temps] which is 
necessary for the dialectic’, as he put it in his seminar papers of 1973-
1974 – goes a long way in explaining the complex and tortuous 
trajectory that he sees in his own work (as he looks back over it in 1973); 
and this is true even in the fragment ‘Dialectics’ in Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes, where he is reluctant to propose that the spiral might be, 
for him, the third term of the dialectic that is missing in his work, 
preferring to a synthesis, a ‘translation [déport]’.10 
     Might it therefore be an idea to trace the dialectic in Barthes by 
working through his career in reverse? This would have the advantage of 
avoiding a teleological approach, in which moving across the spiral in the 
opposite direction, and using a binary analysis such as that deployed in 
the recent biography by Marie Gil, would allow for the movement in 
Barthesian thought with respect to the dialectic. Gil very persuasively 
places ‘oscillation’ as the fundamental figure and movement of Barthes’s 
life; and, using a reverse trajectory, Gil highlights the paradox whereby 
the tragedy – the major event in Barthes’s life in her view – comes only at 
the very end of his life, when his mother dies only three years before he 
does.11 Is there not however a danger of teleology in this schema of tragic 
oscillation proposed? Indeed, the ‘two-term dialectic’ that Gil seems to 
be using might be redolent of Jaurès and his famous comment in the 
introduction to his life-long work on the history of the French 
Revolution: ‘our interpretation of history will be both materialist with 
Marx and mystical with Michelet’.12 So it is to Marx and then Michelet 
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II  Dialectic  of  ‘Two Terms’ 
 
 
Writing to his friend Philippe Rebeyrol in July 1946, Barthes described, 
following his reading of Marx’s The Holy Family, how disappointed he 
was by Marxism.13 Such was the simplistic nature of materialist analysis 
that he would never be able to ‘overcome [his] repulsion for materialism 
as a philosophy’, which seemed to him to be one ‘of confusion, weakness 
and puerility, in the extreme’: ‘[n]ever’ would he be able to believe that 
‘the nec plus ultra of psychology is behaviourism’. ‘What’s more’, 
continued Barthes, ‘all these Marxist commentators are ludicrous in their 
severity’. There was, he conceded however, ‘one sole exception’; indeed, 
Barthes found it ‘very telling to have been so persuaded by a mere 
commentator of Marx (Sidney Hook) and so disappointed (so far) by 
Marx himself’. Yet, Barthes underlined, ‘politically’ he could barely think 
in any way other than ‘Marxistly’ (using a slightly odd neologism: 
‘marxistement’). The ‘description of the world’ by Marxists ‘alone’ was 
‘correct’; and the ‘suppleness’ and the ‘intelligence’ he found in Marxist 
theory was sorely lacking in Marxian practice. This led Barthes to make 
two reservations as to his own political commitment; feeling ‘reticent for 
the moment’, he questioned, firstly, ‘the link between a materialist 
philosophy, notoriously insufficient, and the Marxist revolution’, which 
seemed to him to be ‘true’, secondly, ‘the place, the nature of the 
intellectual in this revolution’. 
     Hook was an American theoretician, and, in the 1930s, a 
Communist activist, whose 1933 book Towards the Understanding of 
Karl Marx exerted a major influence on American Marxism. Translated 
into French in 1936, Pour comprendre Marx was, for the Barthes of 1946, 
the only book by Hook available in French.14 It considered Philosophy 
and Marxist practice, using voluntarist conceptions of the actor in 
History drawn, on the one hand, from Karl Korsch for practice, and on 
the other, from Georg Lukács for the Marxian dialectic. As a non-
orthodox Marxist, Hook was helping to reinvent Marxism, in the 
aftermath of its ‘castration’ by the Second and then the Third 
International, both of which, he suggested, had marginalised the 
‘philosophy of action’ in Marxism. As a precursor to what Perry 
Anderson has called ‘Western Marxism’, Hook mixed the instrumentalist 
pragmatism of a John Dewey with the method of historical materialism; 
for Hook, it was the ‘suppleness’ of the dialectic in Marx that mattered 
in the marrying of the theoretical and the practical.15  
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    If there is a clear trace of Barthes’s interest in the ‘suppleness’ of 
the dialectic in the ideas of Sidney Hook, there is equal influence on his 
work of Lukácsian ideas, and most clearly in ‘Myth Today’ which we will 
consider in a moment. For example, in Towards the Understanding of 
Karl Marx, Hook declares that ‘the philosophy of Marx is a dialectical 
synthesis of those objective and subjective moments’.16 Despite Barthes’s 
seeming desire in 1971 to deny any knowledge of Lukács after the 
Second World War, it is hard to miss the Lukácsian arguments in 
Writing Degree Zero as well as in the notion of the ‘dialectique d’amour’ 
(amorous dialectic) in the overlooked mythology that Barthes published 
in 1954.17 But the most important part of Barthes’s work where we find 
the ‘suppleness’ of the dialectic is in his writings on the nineteenth-
century (post-)romantic historian, Jules Michelet. For Barthes, the ‘dance 
of the dialectic’ (to borrow Bertell Ollman’s expression18) is 
unmistakeable in Michelet’s voluminous writings, which Barthes 
‘devoured’ during his war-time years in the sanatorium at Saint-Hilaire 
du Touvet. 
     Indeed, in his very first publication on Michelet, in a 1951 
number of the prestigious journal Esprit, Barthes presented the historian 
as a god of the future, acting as a magistrate of History, all this by dint of 
his position of ulteriority; however – and this is crucial – in Barthes’s 
eyes, Michelet is also an ‘eater of History’, that is, the person who walks 
with the actants of History – the ‘people’ – who are blind, so to speak, as 
to where their actions will end up.19 This gymnastic dialectic (at once, 
here and there) – what Edward Thompson calls ‘the enormous 
condescension of posterity’ – makes Michelet, to use Edmund Wilson’s 
expression, the ‘historian from below’ par excellence. As Barthes 
maintained, the ‘foundation of History’ for Michelet was ‘in the final 
instance’ – he wrote in a manner similar to that of Friedrich Engels 
affirming Marx’s materialism – ‘the bodily death of millions of humans’; 
the ‘body Historian’ had found a way of ‘[r]emaking the life of the 
dead’.20 Barthes was suggesting then that Michelet could, in a utopian 
manner, be simultaneously here and there, was able to put himself both 
outside and inside History.21 In his second publication on Michelet, in 
Les Lettres nouvelles in 1953, Barthes proposed that Michelet’s ‘History 
knew only a linear dialectic, two-stroke [à deux temps]’; whereas, here, in 
1951, Michelet’s was described as a ‘dialectic of two terms’.22 
     The resemblance between this dialectic of Michelet using two 
terms only, on the one hand, and the one deployed by Barthes in 1968 
with respect to Honoré de Balzac’s 1830 tale Sarrasine on the other is 
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striking. A crucial aspect of the levels of analysis in the resultant essay of 
1970, S/Z, is precisely the mobility of the reader (aware, critical), on one 
side, and that of the ‘blind’ protagonist, Sarrasine, on the other; to be 
able to be both a critic of the strange story that Balzac delegates to a 
narrator to tell and, at the same time, to trace the castrating trap of the 
anecdote (which is itself narrated by an old man to a young woman at a 
party) could be described as a dialectical form of reading, as it is able to 
be both external and internal to the plot. What Barthes called 
‘paragrammatic’ literary criticism deployed a particular type of analysis 
which, to use Barthes’s words about Michelet in the 1950s, consists of 
‘overview [survol]’ of the story (or history, in Michelet) of the tricked 
sculptor Sarrasine, as well as the ‘tableau’ of the same story, in what 
Barthes calls a ‘stereographic’ reading.23 It is certainly not new for a 
novelist to put themself inside the head of a fictional character; but a 
literary critic, using a dialectical, toing-and-froing between the outside 
and the inside of the story, certainly is! Sarrasine in Balzac – and the 
‘people’ in Michelet – must be the object of a level of subjectivity in 
which the reader (and writer) must experience the blindness of the 
actants. The ‘all possible readers’ level of reading that Barthes assigns to 
the notion of general reader operates in tandem with the approach of the 
literary critic who must recognise what he called in 1960 the writer’s 
‘failed commitment’ [engagement manqué], the ability only to glance at 
‘the Promised land’ resulting in an oblique form of criticism.24 This 
resembles precisely the ‘two-term’ dialectic that Barthes found in the 
work of Jules Michelet, in which the historian – a populist scribe of the 
people – sees and, as people, does not see, what happens in the end.25 
     It is not surprising then – though the wording might startle a 
little – that in his favourable review in Critique in 1954 of Michelet par 
lui-même, Bernard Dort congratulated Barthes (and the whole collection 
par lui-même) for the ‘totalitarian’ approach (totalitarian in the good 
sense of attempting to reach totality). Indeed, ‘totalité’ was one of the 
three key categories of the dialectic according to Engels and to Lukács, 
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III Mythologies , or  the ‘Amputated’  Dialectic 
 
 
‘The study of myth leads us to contradictory findings.’ 
(Claude Lévi-Strauss26) 
 
‘At bottom, it would only be the degree zero which could resist myth.’ 
(Barthes, ‘Myth Today’27) 
 
‘Myth […] does away with all dialectics.’  
(Barthes, ‘Myth Today’28) 
 
 
In the discussion of semiology in ‘Myth Today’, written in Summer 
1956, Barthes recognises with regret that there is in critical thought, 
including semiology, the risk of amputating the dialectic: 
 
The important thing is to see that the unity of an 
explanation cannot be based on the amputation of one or 
the other of its approaches, but, as Engels said, on the 
dialectical coordination of the particular sciences it makes 
use of. This is the case with mythology: it is part both of 
semiology inasmuch as it is a formal science, and of 
ideology inasmuch as it is a historical science: it studies 
ideas-in-form. (p. 97) 
 
Yet, Barthes seems to justify this same amputation when he defends 
ideologism against Stalinism at the end of the essay, and to have perhaps 
forgotten the categories of the dialectic in Engels. Indeed, though 
criticising Michelet in 1951 for his use of the ‘amputated’ dialectic, 
Barthes seems to become influenced by this same truncated dialectic in 
‘Myth Today’.  
     Having dismantled both bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology 
in the preceding 50 essays, he proceeds at the end of Mythologies to a 
theorisation of the semiological method that he has used, but this is done 
in the political and cultural context of 1956. Demoralised by the marked 
decline in the fortunes of a truly popular theatre in France, of which he 
had been an active member between 1953 and 1956, Barthes 
characterises the position of the mythologist as one in which the 
‘Promised Land’ cannot be seen; this leads the mythologist to accept that 
that they are in some sense excluded from a truly people’s culture, and 
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that consequently ideologism, as a form of metalanguage, must be 
operated from the outside of contemporary culture; but this, he insists, is 
better than Stalinist abdication: 
 
It is true that ideologism resolves the contradiction of 
alienated reality by an amputation, not a synthesis (but as 
for Zhdanovism, it does not even resolve it): wine is 
objectively good, and at the same time, the goodness of wine 
is a myth: here is the aporia. (p. 187) 
 
This notion of an aporia seems to be a more mature version of the 
‘amorous dialectic’ that he had theorised in 1954 in the mythology 
‘Phenomenon or Myth?’, and it is to become – in dialectical terms, the 
‘amputated synthesis’ – the overall method of Barthesian analysis for the 
rest of his career: 
 
But exposing [myth] is really nothing more than explaining 
it; and that’s me more than ever linked to my historical 
moment, engaged with it in a real dialectic of love. For, in 
so far as every mythology is the palpable surface of human 
alienation, it is humanity which I see in all myths: I hate 
this alienation, but I realise that for the time being this is 
the only way I can locate my contemporaries.29 
 
So the amputation of the dialectic – at least in ‘Myth Today’, drafted in 
1956 – takes on a tactical importance: 
 
Against a certain quixotism of synthesis, quite platonic 
incidentally [hélas], all criticism must consent to the ascesis, 
to the artifice of analysis; and in analysis, it must match 
method and language.30 
 
Is this holding-back akin to the refusal to conclude that Flaubert 
proposed?31 Or rather, is it part of a ‘responsible’, politically-committed 
formalism?32 Clearly, Barthes considers the truncated dialectic – 
amputated and then formalised – to be the most supple and mobile 
weapon in the battle against myth’s ‘motility’. Indeed, though following 
Marx’s idea in the post-face to the second edition Capital that the 
dialectic is like ‘an abomination for the bourgeoisie’, the Barthes of 
Mythologies uses the dialectic as a weapon against the ‘immobilism’ of 
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois myth; but his analysis begins to accept 
that myth too is mobile, agile, dialectical. Therefore, his critique of the 
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amputated dialectic itself has to be … dialectical.33 Thus, it is with a 
certain formalism in the conception and use of the dialectic that Barthes 
moves into the 1960s and it is this that dominates in his praise for 
another dialectician, his friend and colleague Edgar Morin. 
 
 
IV Morin and ‘Parametrism’ 
 
 
‘And even when I am affirming, I am still asking’ 
(Jacques Rigaut, cited by Barthes in Théâtre Populaire in 195534) 
 
 
Barthes’s 1965 article praising Morin’s ‘dialectical writing’ contains 
much that could be called Hegelian formalism, promoting an ‘open’, 
two-term dialectic, that is not synthesised as it would be in Hegel and 
Marx; and Barthes uses elements of Marx’s early thought to do this. Also 
collected in Barthes’s Essais critiques, but written seven years before the 
‘Authors and Writers’ essay that we have briefly analysed above, ‘The 
World-Object’, in its original 1953 version, has as its epigraph a 
quotation by Marx: ‘L’histoire ne peut répondre aux vieilles questions 
qu’en s’en posant de nouvelles’.35 Barthes quotes this again in his 1965 
article on Morin’s dialectical writing. 
     Barthes had been using Marx’s quote, in the 1953 essay on 
seventeenth-century Dutch painting, as part of his ‘degree zero’ thesis on 
the ‘longue durée’ manner (as much Trotskyan as it is Braudelian) in 
which bourgeois ideology came to ideological power not spontaneously 
with the Glorious Revolution of 1789-1794 that handed political power 
to the bourgeois class, but over centuries of ideologico-cultural 
implantation and socio-economic ascendancy. But here, in 1965, 
Barthes’s dialectical understanding is applied, using Marx’s quote, to the 
relationship between research on the one hand, and the writing-up of 
this research on the other as found in Morin’s work. Barthes uses Marx’s 
(somewhat enigmatic) quotation to illustrate the ‘open’ dialectic used by 
Morin, but without ignoring his own earlier views on the non-dialectics 
of language, to see whether, though research can be dialectical, writing 
itself tends to fail to be dialectical. 
     Barthes begins by describing Morin’s work as triply dialectical: 
firstly in its inspiration (Hegel and Marx); secondly in its understanding 
of the contradictory forces operating on any one phenomenon in history 
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and which Morin is not afraid to totalise (in the way that Morin includes 
the future as a ‘natural dimension of time’); finally, and most 
importantly, in its ‘dialectical imagination’, or rather, Barthes corrects 
himself, in its ‘imagining’, in its ability to ‘see ideas, not in their 
separation, their cultural ranking, their attachments, but as a sort of 
nomadic substance, of which the book, from one end to the other, from 
Freud to Marx, from the revolution to science, is the vast territory of 
migration’.36 Whilst this imagination in Morin’s work, continues 
Barthes, is ‘prospective, syncretic’, it remains critical: ‘it sees with equal 
force what is, what must not be and what must be’. Barthes then cites the 
key phrase by Morin, and which is crucial to the dialectic at work in his 
research: ‘“The principle of synthesis in no way extinguishes the principle 
of antagonism’”.37 
    It is by following this non-synthesised dialectic that Morin’s 
writing can take up this ‘wager [which] is not easy’, whereby in the 
modern period (as opposed to the time of Bonald, Fourier and Michelet) 
the dialectic is a ‘demand that is much more severe than utopia’. ‘But’, 
reiterates Barthes, ‘language opposes to dialectical development, to the 
view of contrary phenomena, movements and simultaneities, a natural 
resistance’. This natural resistance to the dialectic is (as we mentioned 
earlier) the ‘linear, monodic’ structure of language, in which the multiple 
phenomena all at once that is reality, can indeed be represented in 
language but only in series, ‘one after the other’: analysis is language’s 
domain, not synthesis or antagonism; and, in a premonition of the post-
structuralist insistence on différance – as opposed to the more static 
différence of structuralism (différer in French, as Derrida famously 
pointed out, means ‘to defer’ as well as ‘to differ’) – Barthes insists on the 
temporal aspect to meaning in a sentence as indicative of language’s 
inability to say more than one thing at once, of its failure to be 
dialectical.38 Indeed Morin, says Barthes, has unceasingly to live with this 
‘squaring of the circle’, in which his writing (Barthes does not give any 
direct examples from Morin’s work) is ‘both direct and baroque, 
vigorous and précieuse, situated outside of literature and within rhetoric’, 
as it attempts to impose on language that which the latter rejects the 
most: ‘a dialectical dimension’. Barthes now cites the quote from Marx 
above to illustrate the dialectic in Morin’s writing, how it hoists the 
problems encountered onto a higher, unexpected level: 
 
As soon as an antinomy threatens to become fixed, Morin 
transports it ‘elsewhere’, gives it some new terms that 
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surround it and modifies the system of which it was a part; 
[…] he thus operates a veritable enlarging of meaning.39 
 
Clearly thinking back to the Saussurean model of the sign that he had 
illustrated in ‘Myth Today’, Barthes suggests that this enlarging of 
meaning is not a metaphor, since a sign can have meaning only if it can 
be integrated into a higher order, a word being a word only because it is 
in a sentence. Thus, Morin’s skill, says Barthes, is to take the fragmentary 
and heteroclite sign and to try and always imagine a ‘sentence’, or wider 
horizon, that can underpin meaning. This is for Morin ‘the resilience of 
dialectical discourse’; but the movement that it entails is maintained at 
the level of writing: 
 
The object of study is never given without its contradictory 
attributes, is only ever defined as a meeting-point 
[croisement], and which is falsely symmetrical, of a number 
of terms (this is the ancient notion of chiasma), whereby 
rhetoric becomes a veritable dialectical instrument; this is 
because only form is able, in the final instance, to correct 
the inability of language to make sense of the object’s 
movement, of its alternating [contrariété] and generally of 
its other logic.40 
 
This is Morin’s ‘gongorism’, suggests Barthes; and it is whilst describing 
this ‘gongorism’ that Barthes returns to his idea that writing cannot itself 
be dialectical.41 In so doing, he pursues the points on language and 
dialectics that he had made in ‘Authors and Writers’.  
     Reality, he asserts, might be ‘several things at once’ – that is, 
contradictory, even dialectical – but language is ‘linear, monadic 
[monodique]’. It is this structure of language that prevents the writer from 
being dialectical in language; for the language of a writer is obliged to list 
these contradictory realities one after the other, that is, only in serial, not 
synthetic, fashion. Thus ‘a writer’, asserts Barthes, ‘can declare the 
dialectic, but not represent it’. Morin’s work however, and especially his 
writing in Barthes’s view, seems to get around this problem. It is, ‘in the 
end, the expression of a serious struggle’, the stakes of which are 
normally hidden by the ‘platitude’ of classical language and its desire for 
‘taste’ and by the ‘unhealthy ablutions’ typical of the language purists. 
The author [écrivain], says Barthes, gesturing back to his thesis in 
‘Authors and Writers’, ‘is condemned to achieve nothing’; but, ‘by dint 
of choosing a way of speaking, the writer can approximate by fascination 
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that which reality achieves by construction’; and this is the case for 
Morin: 
 
by dint of enunciating in a thousand different ways the 
opposing and future dimensions of phenomena, [Morin’s 
writing] ends up imposing the requirement of dialectics.42 
 
This is done, suggests Barthes, in such a way that, having read Morin, it 
is impossible to see things ‘from one side’; or at least, if one insists on 
doing so, it is one’s loss. 
    There is clearly a gesture not just forwards to post-structuralism, 
but backwards, with the reference to rhetoric and dialectic, towards 
Aristotle.43 But this is not Barthes’s main point. As so often with 
Barthes’s enigmatic descriptions of others’ writing, it is perhaps more of 
an injunction to himself on how to write (or, in many other cases, how 
not to write). It will be instructive therefore to finish this consideration of 
language and dialectics by looking at Barthes’s views on Marx and 
language. Following May 1968, in the years of turmoil 1969-1972, 
Barthes moves back, if only briefly, to Marx, having seemingly left 
behind his thought and writing, from 1957 onwards, for the euphoria of 
semiology that lasted, at least, until 1967. 
 
 
V ‘Undialectica l’  Marx 
 
‘[W]hat, at the level of discourse, distinguishes dialectics from compromise?’ 
(Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’44) 
 
 
From the work of Philippe Roger, who suggests that Barthes learns very 
quickly in the 1950s how to ‘retordre le bâton’ [bend the stick] in a 
dialectical way, to that of Jean-Claude Milner, who insists on the Marxist 
‘underpinning’ in Barthes’s approach to cultural and literary analysis, 
Barthes’s interest in Marx and Marxism has been broadly covered.45 But 
little mention has been made of its engagement with language. One critic 
has looked, as part of a study of Barthes’s ‘xyloglossia’, at the cherry-tree 
example from Marx’s German Ideology used in ‘Myth Today’; for our 
purposes here, it will be instructive to concentrate on the parallels of 
Marx’s work on Capital and Barthes’s complex research on language; 
firstly, because Marx defines Capital as a relation, thereby corroborating 
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Maurice Godelier’s view that Marx was one of the first Structuralists; 
secondly, and more importantly, Barthes’s ‘return’ to Marx in 1971 
(following over a decade of intensive semiological research across the 
1960s) entailed the outline of a new, startling project.46 
     In an interview in 1971, with Guy Scarpetta in Promesse, Barthes 
expressed his desire to work on a political theory of language. What is 
striking about this suggestion is not so much the political nature of the 
project – we are, after all, in the ultra-radical period that followed the 
first phase of May 68, with the Maoist turn, in particular of Tel Quel, 
now underway – but the parallel that Barthes gives to the project: 
‘something like the Capital of linguistic science’.47 The discussion with 
Scarpetta then moves onto a much wider terrain. Reacting to Scarpetta’s 
assertion that language is not a ‘superstructure’, Barthes suggests that, 
whether language is a superstructure or not, ‘the rapport with language is 
political’. Barthes qualifies this by adding that one would not know it in 
a country like France which is historically and culturally ‘“tassée”’ 
[squashed down] and where ‘the French are simply asleep, made apathetic 
[chloroformés] by centuries of classical authority’; and he contrasts this 
with countries that are ‘less well-off [moins nantis]’, such as Arab 
countries emerging from colonialism (and no doubt specifically 
Morocco, from where he has recently returned); there the link between 
language and politics is a ‘burning’ question.48 It is worth quoting the 
description of the project in full: 
 
We are missing a political theory of language, a 
methodology which would allow us to see the ways in 
which language is appropriated and to study the 
‘ownership’ of the means of enunciation, something like the 
Capital of linguistic science.49 
 
One might argue that Barthes had already done this, to some extent at 
least, during the 1950s, when he mobilised his demystifications. 
However, the use of Marx’s cherry-tree in ‘Myth Today’ carries a certain 
pessimism with it.50 It illustrates for Barthes, firstly, the fact that 
language, pace Sartre, is mediated, and secondly, and more importantly, 
that myth – the opposite, and suppressor, of dialectics – prevents all 
unmediated communication between humans. Here in 1971, by 
contrast, Barthes’s disillusion with Marxian progress in the second half of 
the 1950s – he said that the mythologist can see no ‘Promised Land’ in 
‘Myth Today’, let us remember – is, albeit temporarily, reversed 
following the explosion of 1968. Suddenly Marx returns to Barthes’s 
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sights in the wake of the radical sixties, not in the tragedy-farce spiral so 
beloved of Marx, rather in a replay of the phosphorus metaphor that is 
deployed in Writing Degree Zero: Barthes’s explicit interest in Marx here 
in 1971, not so long before his description in 1977 of Marxism’s 
deployment as ‘stupidity’, seems to burn most brightly when it is close to 
extinguishing itself.51 
     In his contribution to the special number of Tel Quel on his own 
œuvre in 1971, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, Barthes returns, in a 
brief section called ‘The Chain of Discourses’, to the idea that we have 
seen in the 1965 article on Morin that language cannot itself be 
dialectical. In contrast to his view of Morin’s ‘dialectical writing’, Barthes 
now argues that Marx, despite his intense and crucial use of the dialectic, 
is not at all a dialectical writer. Barthes’s argument relies on what he has 
said already about the linear, monadic nature of language being not 
conducive to language having an ability to show the contradictory, 
multiple sides to reality. He uses the examples of Chomsky as a rebuttal 
of Bloomfeld’s behaviourism and then semiotics’ supersession of 
Chomsky’s ‘mentalism (or anthropologism)’ to suggest that ‘a new 
discourse can only emerge as the paradox which goes against (and often 
goes for) the surrounding or preceding doxa, can only see the day as 
difference, distinction, working loose against that which sticks to it’. 
Having suggested that Marx’s ‘discourse is almost entirely paradoxical, 
the doxa being Proudhon, now someone else, and so on’, he moves, with 
Marx, towards Vico and the two-term dialectic of the spiral: 
 
This twofold movement of separation and renewal results 
not in a circle but […] in a spiral, and it is in this drift of 
circularity (of paradoxical form) that historical 
determinations are articulated.52 
 
     It is precisely this (somewhat surprising) view of Marx’s own 
undialectical language that leads Barthes towards a two-term dialectic in 
his own writing, and which seems to be linked to the ‘ideologism’ that he 
had described as the only option for the mythologist in 1957 that we 
mentioned above and which, in the absence of any sight of the ‘Promised 
Land’, truncated the form and outcome of its critique. 
     In his brief but incisive commentary on ‘The Chain of 
Discourses’ fragment in ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, Ed White 
argues that this discussion shows Barthes asserting that ‘dialectical 
thinking simply does not exist’; only for White then to contradict 
himself somewhat, a few lines later, when he suggests that Barthes’s 
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fragment tries ‘to give an alternative of [sic] dialectical thinking’.53 White 
seems to agree with Barthes that Marx’s writing is ‘paradoxical’, not 
dialectical; but this is possibly a result of both Barthes’s and White’s 
arguments working with a limited set of examples, that is ‘Proudhon etc’. 
It would seem to me that Marx is, at different times, ‘paradoxical’ in 
Barthes’s sense and also (classically) dialectical, depending on the 
context.54 Though Barthes is clearly influenced by Althusserian categories 
in 1971 – especially the ‘epistemological break’ that Althusser saw Marx 
operating, largely, in The German Ideology – the above formulation does 
not seem Althusserian in any way.55 Furthermore, in the militant 1971 
essay ‘Languages at War in a Culture at Peace’, Barthes sets out how 
language is deeply class-divided, carrying this argument into the ‘Writers, 
Intellectuals, Teachers’ essay in Tel Quel.56  
     Here, he argues in the post-68 world – unlike in Marx’s time – 
the modern world of mass communication facing the proletariat requires 
‘representatives ... in a word, oblates who devote themselves to the 
proletarian interpretation of cultural facts’.57 But, as Barthes had already 
argued in ‘Myth Today’ with regard to the exclusion from the proletariat 
of the mythologist, these ‘oblates’’ have a ‘class situation [which] is not 
that of the proletariat’; furthermore, he asks, if the proletariat is 
‘separated’ from intellectuals by its petty-bourgeois culture and is ‘mute’ 
because it is cut off from intellectuals (and whose radical critique is the 
‘unconscious’ of the intellectual), how do we join ‘the materialist and the 
Freudian dialectics’? In a replay (or spiral) of his ‘Promised Land’ of 
‘Myth Today’ whereby the dialectic cannot act, Barthes in 1971 is only 
more convinced that the language of materialist cultural critique does not 
speak for the masses, that it can only be ‘a silk shot through with tactics 
[une moire de tactiques]’.58 By suggesting that this ‘moire de tactiques’ has 
to be mobile because different arguments over the complexity of 
contemporary mass culture are ‘occasionally contradictory’ and above all 
‘established on different temporalities [temps, in italics in French]’, 
Barthes seems to be moving his point about language not being 
dialectical – but monodic and linear – onto the level of cultural critique 
(which is for Barthes, after all, only language). 
     One answer to his conundrum cited as the epigraph above, about 
dialectic as compromise, is that offered by Tel Quel in its Maoist phase of 
1971 (and to which Barthes alludes when he mentions those ‘who finally 
prefer to give up the problem, to dismiss all “culture” [...] entail[ing] the 
destruction of all discourse’); another is his own desire to write as 
Nietzsche does ‘from abyss to abyss’.59 When Barthes suggests that the 
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dialectic of criticism is one of tactics, it is indeed the writer who is 
dialectised, and not the world. It is here that Barthes seems supremely 
dialectical, in the compromising sense (as illustrated by the quotation at 
the beginning of this section). The ‘bastard’ (third) term upon which 
Barthes alights in ‘Authors and Writers’ in 1960 – with which to suggest 
that there are those writers who combine elements of Author and Writer 
– seems to summarise well his own approach to writing throughout his 
career.60 The formalist way in which Barthes understands and uses the 
dialectic resembles what Maurice Merleau-Ponty called the ‘hyper-
dialectic’.61 We might be tempted therefore to modify slightly Barthes’s 
enigmatic allusion to Rimbaud quoted at the start of this essay, ‘il faut 
être dialectique’: ‘we must be dialectical’. 
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1 Roland Barthes, ‘Authors and Writers’, in A Barthes Reader, ed. by Susan 
Sontag (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 188. As I have pointed out in my 
article on Barthes’s ‘dialectical’ way of writing in his diary of his 1974 visit to 
China – ‘Roland Barthes’s Travels in China: Writing A Diary of Dissidence 
within Dissidence?’, in Deliberations: The Journals of Roland Barthes, ed. by Neil 
Badmington (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 96 note 3 – there is a sentence 
missing in the English translation: ‘the spoken dialectic’, continues Barthes, ‘is 
wishful thinking’ [‘La dialectique parlée est un vœu pieux’]; see Roland Barthes, 
Essais critiques (Paris: Seuil, 1964), p. 150 note 5. 
2 The Rimbaud quotation comes from the final ‘Adieu’ section of his 1873 
writings A Season in Hell, trans. by Enid Rhodes Peschel (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 105. 
3 Roland Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, in A Barthes Reader, p. 388. 
4 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography, trans. by Richard 
Howard (London: Fontana, 1984), pp. 71-72. 
5 See Roland Barthes, ‘Michelet, l’Histoire et la mort’ (‘Michelet, History, 
Death’), Esprit, April 1951, 497-510, republished in Roland Barthes, Œuvres 
complètes, ed. by Éric Marty, 5 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 2002), vol. I, pp. 109-23.  
(References to the Œuvres complètes will henceforth be in the form of OC, 
followed by volume and page number.) The reference to Edgar Morin’s work 
on death in the original French version of Camera Lucida is not included in the 
English version; in the French version, Barthes refers to Morin’s very first book, 
and its use of the Hegelian view of the dialectics of death (OC V, p. 848); in 
‘“To Philosophize Is to Learn to Die”’ – in Signs in Culture: Roland Barthes 
Today, ed. by Steven Ungar and Betty R. McGraw (Iowa City: University of 
Iowa Press, 1989), pp. 3-31 – Gary Shapiro points out that Hegel ‘formulated 
the principle that the child is the death of its parents’ as part of human 
dialectics, and hence that Barthes’s own death, given his childlessness, is 
‘undialectical’; see Edgar Morin, L’homme et la mort, new ed. (Paris: Seuil, 
1970), pp. 281-293, especially p. 287. Morin’s book was originally published in 
1951. 
6 Éric Marty, ‘Barthes philosophe’, Le Monde des livres, 23 January 2015, 2. 
7 In the English translation of Leys’ work, ‘abyssale’ is translated as 
‘unfathomable’; see ‘Footnote to a Barthesian Opuscule’, in Simon Leys, Broken 
Images: Essays on Chinese Culture and Politics, trans. by Steve Cox (London: 
Allison and Busby, 1979), p. 88); see also Stafford, ‘Roland Barthes’s Travels in 
China’, p. 86. 
8 On this ‘new’ dialectic, see Malgorzata Kowalska, Dialectics Beyond Dialectics: 
Essay on Totality and Difference (Oxford and Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2015). 
9 Louis-Jean Calvet, Roland Barthes: A Biography, trans. by Sarah Wykes 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 23; on the perceived 
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‘suppleness’ of Fournié’s version of the dialectic, see the 1971 interview with 
Barthes, ‘Responses: Interview with Tel Quel’, trans. by Vérène Grieshaber, in 
The Tel Quel Reader, ed. by Patrick ffrench and Roland-François Lack 
(London: Routledge, 1998), p. 252, though the term ‘souplesse’ in the French 
is rendered as ‘flexibility’. 
10 See Roland Barthes, Le Lexique de l’auteur. Séminaire à l’École pratique des 
hautes études 1973-1974 (Paris: Seuil, 2010), p. 274 and Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 68-
69. 
11 See Marie Gil, Roland Barthes. Essai biographique (Paris: Flammarion, 2012), 
especially chapter 0. 
12 See Jaurès’s ‘Introduction’ to The Socialist History of the French Revolution of 
1900, available at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/jaures/1901/history/introduction.htm. 
Accessed 2 June 2017. On Marx’s early theorisation of a non-synthesised 
dialectic, see Jean-François Gava, Contrariété sans dialectique. Logique et 
politique hégéliennes face à la critique sociale marxienne (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
2011). 
13 A good number of the letters from Roland Barthes to Philippe Rebeyrol are 
not included in Album (Paris: Seuil, 2015, due to be translated for Columbia 
University Press in January 2018); and this correspondence, currently being 
catalogued at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (under the code ‘NAF 28630 
– Fond Roland Barthes’), was very kindly shown to me by M. Rebeyrol before 
his death and before being transferred from the ‘Fonds Barthes’ at l’IMEC to 
the BNF. The translations of this unpublished correspondence are all my own. 
14 I have used the French version: Sidney Hook, Pour comprendre Marx, trans. 
by Mario Rietti (Paris: Gallimard, 1936). Hook’s analysis contains important 
considerations on myth and ideology in an alienated society which may have 
influenced the mythologies Barthes wrote ten years later. 
15 See Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (London, Verso, 
1979) and Hook, Pour comprendre Marx, pp. 14-34, pp. 59ff. See also Hook’s 
study of historical praxis, The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and 
Possibility (New York: John Day, 1943) which tries to describe the Marxian 
notions of ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ in terms of pragmatism. On this subject, 
Barthes wrote the following in the newspaper version of ‘Triumph and  
Rupture of Bourgeois Writing’ (Combat, 9 November 1950, 4), in a discussion 
about the ‘deep rapport’ between ‘Form’ and ‘History’ not included in Writing 
Degree Zero: ‘(It may be […] that the problem of the determinism of 
superstructures will one day be resolved by looking more at forms and 
structures rather than at the traditional history of ideas where the intermediaries 
[relais] are more numerous and more complex)’. 
16 Hook, Pour comprendre Marx, p. 14. Barthes’s investment in Marxism was 
highly ambivalent. In August 1946, he wrote to Rebeyrol to express his 
admiration for Marx’s 1851 essay on the coup d’état by Napoleon III: ‘I have 
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risen above Marxism; I think that I have got it out of my system [exorcisé]; I 
have just been reading, with greatest pleasure, The 18th Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, a beautiful work, powerful in its cohesion, its air of truth’. ‘But’, he 
added, ‘our Marxists today, so pretentious, so proud of their materialist 
philosophy, are miles away from the active intelligence of this book, from its 
suppleness even. Indeed, someone who believes, to whatever extent, in literature 
cannot be absolutely Marxist. It requires such partisanship’. 
17 Barthes, ‘Responses’, p. 254; Barthes, ‘Phénomène ou mythe?’, a ‘petite 
mythologie’ which appeared in Les Lettres nouvelles in December 1954 but was 
not included in Mythologies (OC, V, pp. 1022-23). 
18 For Ollman’s work on the dialectic, see 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/dd_ch01.php. Accessed 9 July 2017. 
19 Barthes, ‘Michelet, l’Histoire et la mort’, OC I, pp. 110-12. 
20 Barthes, ‘Michelet, l’Histoire et la mort’, OC I, p. 122. ‘In the final instance’ 
is a ‘materialist’ expression that can be found regularly in Barthes’s writing; it is 
redolent of Althusser for an older Barthes, but here, in 1951, it is to Engels that 
Barthes seems to be alluding; see the preface to Engels, Origins of the Family, 
Private Property and the State (1884), available at: 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1884/origin-family/preface.htm. 
Accessed 7 July 2017. 
21 See the first part of Edmund Wilson, To the Finland Station, chapters 1-4, on 
Michelet, which, published in 1940, preceded Barthes’s study of Michelet by a 
decade. As a colleague and comrade of Sidney Hook, Wilson also put forward a 
voluntarist view of history. Though there is no evidence to suggest that Barthes 
had read Wilson’s work on Michelet, the similarities are striking. According to 
Wilson, Michelet’s historiography was inspired by Vico, Bacon and Grotius, 
and underlined the ‘organic’ nature of human progress; similarly, Barthes 
pointed to the Scienza Nuova by Vico – a form of sociology conceived long 
before the birth of the discipline of the same name according to Wilson –  as a 
major influence on Michelet. And just as Barthes will do, Wilson underlines the 
contradictory aims in Michelet’s historiography. Firstly, Wilson suggested, 
Michelet had tried to find a fusion of distinct materials, in his keenness to 
establish the interrelations between diverse forms of human activities (similar to 
the notions of ‘structure’ and ‘tableau’ in Barthes’s Michelet). Secondly, 
Michelet wanted to capture the colour and feel of a period, that is, by returning 
to the past whilst being (or, pretending to be) ignorant of the outcome (this is 
the ‘récit’ in Michelet for Barthes), maintaining the illusion of having no 
historian’s distance. Finally, in terms that prefigured those of Barthes, Wilson 
put an emphasis on the capacity of Michelet’s prose of supplying a general 
tableau whilst, at the same time, focusing attention on a single historical object, 
which used a technique of narrating and then at certain moments breaking off 
to draw the large historical tableau. Quoting, just as Barthes does (OC I, pp. 
433-44), Proust’s pastiche of Michelet, Wilson insisted on how much Michelet 
 
Andy Stafford 
	   116 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
had tried to live the history that he was narrating. For Wilson, the enormous 
contradiction in Michelet’s life and in the writing strategy deployed in his 
historiography, was that Michelet loved the people, saw them as the agents of 
History, but that, Wilson noted, it was Michelet alone who spoke, acted and 
resurrected the past. 
22 ‘The alterity of historical objects [in Michelet’s writing] is never total, History 
is always familiar, as Time is there only to support an identity between them; its 
movement is equational, its dialectic is of two terms’ (OC I, p. 111); see also 
Roland Barthes, ‘Féminaire de Michelet’, Les Lettres nouvelles, November 1953, 
1092-93. The latter text is not included in his Œuvres complètes. 
23 Roland Barthes, Michelet, trans. by Richard Miller (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), pp. 20-22 and S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1974), p. 15. 
24 See the interview with Barthes in 1970 in Les Nouvelles littéraires (OC III, p. 
645); Barthes, ‘Authors and Writers’, p. 188. 
25 There are some interesting similarities, parallels and dissonances in the 
Michelet presented by Barthes in relation to Walter Benjamin’s unfinished final 
writings, the famous fragments partly inspired by Michelet and written in 1940, 
‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’, in Illuminations (Glasgow: Fontana, 
1973), pp. 255-66. 
26 This is my translation of: ‘L’étude du mythe nous amène à des constatations 
contradictoires’, in Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie Structurale (Paris: Plon, 
1958), p. 229, considerably different from that in Lévi-Strauss, Structural 
Anthropology, trans. by Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1963), p. 208. 
27 Roland Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, in A Barthes Reader, p. 119. 
28 Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, p. 132. 
29 Barthes, ‘Phénomène ou mythe?’, p. 953 (OC V, p. 1023). 
30 Barthes, ‘Myth Today’, p. 96. 
31 ‘The obsession with wanting to conclude is one of the most deadly and sterile 
manias belonging to humanity. Every religion and every philosophy claims to 
have God in it, to have looked the infinite up and down and to know the recipe 
of happiness. What arrogance and what emptiness! I consider, on the contrary, 
that the greatest minds and the greatest works have never concluded’. Gustave 
Flaubert, letter dated 23 October 1865 to Mademoiselle Leroyer de Chantepie, 
in Flaubert, Correspondance V (Paris: éditions Louis Conard, 1929), p. 111 (my 
translation); my gratitude to Diana Knight for having located this quotation. 
32 Barthes wrote: ‘Less terrorized by the specter of “formalism”, historical 
criticism might have been less sterile; it would have understood that the specific 
study of forms does not in any way contradict the necessary principles of 
totality and History. On the contrary: the more a system is specifically defined 
in its forms, the more amenable it is to historical criticism. To parody a well-
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known saying, I shall say that a little formalism turns one away from History, 
but that a lot brings one back to it’; ‘Myth Today’, p. 97. 
33 On Barthes’s response to the ‘motility’ of myth, see Andy Stafford, ‘Dialectics 
of Form(s) in Roland Barthes’s Mythologies’, Nottingham French Studies, 47.2 
(Summer 2008), 6-18. 
34 Barthes, ‘Editorial’, OC I, p. 524. 
35 See ‘Le monde objet’, in Les Lettres nouvelles, June 1953, 394. Marx’s 
unpublished idea that ‘History can answer the old questions only by posing new 
ones’ is from an unfinished 1842 article. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Collected Works (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), vol. I, pp. 182-83. 
36 Roland Barthes, ‘Une écriture dialectique’, Combat, 5 July 1965, 6, 
republished in OC II, pp. 718-19, all translations of which are my own. The 
‘book’ to which Barthes refers is Morin’s 1965 study Introduction à une 
politique de l’homme (Paris: Seuil, 1965). 
37 Interestingly, in his 1957 piece ‘Brecht, Marx et l’Histoire’, Barthes had 
argued a parallel point about Brecht’s use of history in relation to Marx and 
Engel’s conception of the representation of history in theatre; unlike the views 
of Marx and Engels, Brecht’s theatre, wrote Barthes, ‘provokes History but does 
not divulge it, [...] poses the burning problem of History without resolving it’ 
(OC I, p. 909). 
38 Barthes, ‘Une écriture dialectique’, OC II, p. 718. By an interesting parallel, 
Barthes and Derrida had, in their early careers, both been impressed by the 
work of the Franco-Vietnamese philosopher Tran Duc Thao’s Phénoménologie 
et matérialisme dialectique of 1951 (Paris: Gordon & Breach, 1971), which 
Barthes favourably reviewed in Combat in 1951 (OC I, pp. 130-31) and from 
which Derrida took inspiration in his postgraduate studies; Fredric Jameson has 
recently regretted the manner in which the work on the dialectic by Derrida in 
his 1954 Master’s thesis on Husserl (published in 1990) disappeared in his 
subsequent work; see Jameson, The Valences of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 
2010), p. 103. 
39 Barthes, ‘Une écriture dialectique’, OC II, pp. 718-19. 
40 Barthes, ‘Une écriture dialectique’, OC II, p. 719. 
41 Luis de Gongora (1561-1627) was a Spanish poet known for his florid, 
obscure, baroque rhetoric that deploys paradoxes and puns. 
42 Barthes, ‘Une écriture dialectique’, OC II, p. 719. 
43 Writing about a parallel project that he was running on Rhetoric at the same 
time as his 1965 essay on Morin, Barthes wonders whether Aristotle is not the 
key philosopher of ‘so-called mass’ contemporary culture and of that which 
underpins any critique of this culture; see also his suggestion that Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric is actively beholden to the ‘“psychology” of the public’, a dialectical 
understanding of culture if ever there was one. Roland Barthes, ‘Old Rhetoric’, 
in The Semiotic Challenge, trans. by Richard Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1987), pp. 22-23. 
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44 A Barthes Reader, p. 398. 
45 See Philippe Roger, Roland Barthes, roman (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 
1986), pp. 323-43 and ‘Barthes et les années Marx’, in Communications, 63 
(1996), 39-66; Jean-Claude Milner, Le Pas philosophique de Roland Barthes 
(Paris: Verdier, 2003), p. 58 note 7. 
46 Douglas Smith, ‘Barthes’s Xyloglossia: Structuralism and the Language of 
Wood’, Nottingham French Studies, 53.3 (2014), 329–44; Maurice Godelier, 
‘System, Structure and Contradiction in Das Kapital’, in Structuralism. A 
Reader, ed. by Michael Lane (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), pp. 340-58. 
47 Though an English translation of this interview exists – ‘Digression’, in 
Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice, trans. by Linda Coverdale (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1985) – the translations here are my own. Scarpetta describes 
meeting Barthes in late 1970 and how the latter handed over the written 
answers that he had thought about beforehand by way of his responses to 
Scarpetta’s questions; see ‘Flashes’ in La Règle du jeu, 1 (May 1990), 75-76. 
48 Nevertheless, Barthes points out, drawing on his recent experience of 
teaching in Moroccan universities, there is a reactionary idea in such countries 
embarrassed by the old colonial language that one can separate language from 
literature, that one can teach the former without the latter just because the latter 
is considered ‘bourgeois’. 
49 Barthes, ‘Digressions’, OC III, p. 998. 
50 Barthes, Myth Today’, p. 132. 
51 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin 
Smith (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 44; ‘The Image’, in The Rustle of 
Language, trans. by Richard Howard (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 351. 
52 Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, p. 388. 
53 Ed White, How to Read Barthes’ Image-Music-Text (London: Pluto, 2012), p. 
171. 
54 I have recently had the experience of teaching Marx and Engels’ Communist 
Manifesto to first-year university students, and this ‘text’ strikes me as classically 
dialectical, if only because of its practical purpose and application. One might 
accept the theoretical analysis in Parts I and II of the Manifesto, but what 
happens to its historical-materialist critique if one discounts or discards Part III, 
the final, practical section on ‘Communism’? In this ‘truncated’ reading, Parts I 
and II seem to remain ‘paradoxical’ in the way in which Barthes is using the 
word here; but this ‘truncated’ reading would entail – in practical, political 
terms – a very different application from the one that Marx is, in the final 
instance, advocating: a reading of Parts I and II on their own, without Part III, 
loses the revolutionary charge of the Manifesto, ending up with a reformist, even 
romantic, programme of human liberation. 
55 Nevertheless, Barthes’s ‘structuralist’ conception of language fits with 
Althusser’s stress on relationality, what one critic calls ‘the ontological primacy 
of relations’. In this conception Althusser rejects the ‘humanist historicism’ of 
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certain Marxists who maintain that social (including ideological and political) 
relations under capitalism are ‘inter-human, inter-subjective’; whereas, for 
Althusser, humans are ‘agents of the production process and the material 
conditions of the production process, in specific “combinations”’. See Alex 
Callinicos, ‘Appendix. Althusser’s Detour via Relations’, in Deciphering Capital: 
Marx’s Capital and its Destiny (London: Bookmarks, 2014), pp. 317-18. 
Indeed, Barthes’s assertion of the crucial element of the combinatoire in all 
forms of language and communication dovetails with Althusser’s relationism. 
56 Roland Barthes, ‘Languages at War in a Culture at Peace’, Times Literary 
Supplement, 3632 (8 October 1971); republished as ‘Pax Culturalis’ in The 
Rustle of Language, pp. 100-05. 
57 Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, p. 398. 
58 Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, pp. 399-400. On this and its 
relation to his own Marxism, see the unpublished section of Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes called ‘Argument’, numbered as 16, that is reproduced in 
Barthes, Le Lexique de l’auteur, p. 336. 
59 Barthes, ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’, pp. 398-99; and on Nietzsche’s 
‘abyssal’ style, see Barthes, The Grain of the Voice, p. 72. 
60 Indeed, reviewing his own career in 1973 and 1974 with an idea that was 
unpublished, Barthes feels strongly that, despite being badly written (‘mauvais, 
confus, nul’), his 1960 piece ‘Authors and Writers’ nevertheless proposes a 
tenable distinction of the two types of writer; see Tiphaine Samoyault, Roland 
Barthes (Paris: Seuil, 2015), p. 580. 
61 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and The Invisible, trans by Alphonso 
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